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Abstract 
Although mental health disorders such as anxiety and depression are common, there is little 
research on whether individuals in poor mental health react differently from others to financial 
incentives. This paper exploits an experiment from the UK Understanding Society Innovation Panel 
to assess how the participation response to randomly-assigned financial incentives differs by mental 
health status. We find that individuals in good mental health are more likely to respond when 
offered a higher financial incentive, whereas those in poor mental health are indifferent to the 
increased incentive. We find no comparable differences for physical health. 
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Every day individuals are faced with a myriad of financial incentives that encourage or discourage 
certain actions and behaviours. Financial incentives are a key tool used by policy-makers. Examples 
include: fines for poor driving, failing to meet parking restrictions, and not paying taxes on time; 
high taxes on tobacco and alcohol aimed at reducing consumption; incentivising people to return to 
work through changes in welfare benefits; and reducing health care usage through higher co-
payments. Furthermore, a large body of research has demonstrated the importance of non-financial 
incentives, such as intrinsic motivation, reciprocity and social approval. When correctly designed, 
financial and non-financial incentives can act as complements for achieving policy goals (see, for 
example, Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012). 
 With estimates of around one-in-five adults in the UK (McManus et al., 2016; Mental 
Health Foundation, 2015) and US (Mental Health America, 2016) having a mental health condition, 
an important question is whether individuals with mental health problems respond differently to 
incentives from those in good mental health. This is salient, because common mental health 
conditions such as anxiety and depression are characterised by a range of symptoms that could 
affect economic preferences. These symptoms include persistent and excessive worry or fear, 
feelings of sadness or hopelessness, and a loss of energy (American Psychiatric Association [APA] 
2013). Individuals with such symptoms therefore may experience a loss of pleasure from many 
daily activities, and falsely perceive others to be passing harsh judgments on their behaviour. 
 Differences in the response to incentives, if any, could be driven by a smaller marginal 
utility of consumption, particularly if the mental health condition is chronic or comorbid with poor 
physical health (Finkelstein et al., 2013). Another factor could be differences in one’s intrinsic 
motivation to engage in prosocial behaviour; there is growing evidence from economics and other 
behavioural science literatures suggesting that effortful or time-consuming activity is a reflection 
not only of extrinsic financial incentives but also of intrinsic motivation and reputation as seen by 
oneself or others (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Festré and Garrouste, 2015; Frey 
and Jegen, 2001; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). For example, experiments have found that standard 
financial incentives can fail when the incentivised activity is inherently interesting, or a noble 
undertaking (see, for reviews, Fehr and Falk, 2002; Gneezy et al., 2011; Kamenica, 2012). Amidst 
this rich experimental evidence, however, there is little investigation into whether mental health 
plays a role in the pattern of response to incentives. 
It is important to better understand how individuals with poor mental health respond to 
incentives because an empirical literature has documented strong links between mental health and 
economic outcomes. In particular, mental health has been shown to affect individuals’ educational 













Chatterji et al., 2011; Frijters et al., 2014) and how much you earn (e.g. Kessler et al., 2008). Some 
of these differences may stem from a lack of response among those in poor mental health to 
incentives, either of a monetary nature such as higher wages, or a social nature such as prestige. The 
importance of this issue is exemplified by the enormous economic burden of mental health 
problems: in addition to direct costs of medical and social care, there are substantial indirect costs 
from losses to economic output and quality of life (Bloom et al., 2011; Levinson et al., 2010; Lim et 
al., 2008). In the UK, poor mental health is responsible for the largest burden of disease (Ferrari et 
al., 2013), and the estimated annual damage to the economy is estimated to be at least £70 billion, 
or 4.5% of GDP (OECD, 2014).  
 There is little economics research on whether mental health influences the response to 
incentives. However, there is a related literature consisting of laboratory experiments on emotions 
and economic decision-making. These experiments find that induced anxiety, sadness, and other 
affective states lead to economic decisions that differ from those made in a neutral mood (see, for 
examples, Capra, 2004; Capra et al., 2010; Engelmann et al., 2015; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2011; 
Kuhnen and Knutson, 2011; Lerner et al., 2004; Rick and Loewenstein, 2008). In one review on 
poverty and economic behaviour, Haushofer and Fehr (2014) discussed how poor mental health 
caused by poverty can alter individuals’ decision-making in ways that reinforce poverty. Examining 
the interplay between poverty, economic behaviours, and negative affect, they noted how existing 
laboratory findings support the mediating role of negative affect in the relationship between poverty 
and economic behaviours (e.g. time discounting, risk aversion). In a related laboratory experiment 
on motivation and incentives, Chumbley and Fehr (2014) assessed whether one’s response to 
incentives is affected by self-reported “trait” reward motivation, and by induced “state” motivation. 
Trait but not state motivation was found to predict the effort exerted in response to monetary 
incentives. The authors argued that this suggests a fundamental decline in the response to incentives 
when motivation is psychiatrically disordered. Interestingly, in post hoc analyses the authors also 
found a significant negative association between trait anxiety and baseline effort. 
 We aim instead to directly investigate how individuals’ mental health affects their response 
to financial incentives. We use a survey incentives experiment, grounding our hypotheses and 
interpretation of findings in a theoretical framework for incentives and behaviour. Specifically, we 
use the survey incentives experiment from the Innovation Panel of the United Kingdom Household 
Longitudinal Survey (also known as Understanding Society). In this experiment, individuals are 
randomly assigned to different survey incentive conditions to determine which best encourages 
survey participation. This data set allows us to observe how the impact of incentives on 













Our main result is that after accounting for covariates that are correlated with mental health - 
including gender, wages, physical health, and socioeconomic status - we find a mental health 
gradient in the association between survey participation and financial incentive value. Specifically, 
the discrepancy in response between individuals receiving high and low incentive amounts is 
significantly smaller among those in poor mental health. We also find that among the group offered 
low financial incentives, those with poor mental health are more likely to participate than 
individuals with good mental health. These findings are robust across different econometric models 
and different mental health measures. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework 
for incentives and behaviour and suggests pathways via which response to incentives could differ 
by mental health status. Section 3 describes the experiment, and Section 4 details the data and 
empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses results from the main and robustness analyses. Section 6 
summarises the paper’s findings. 
 
2.  Theoretical Framework  
The survey incentives experiment was conducted on the Innovation Panel of the United Kingdom 
Household Longitudinal Survey. This experiment, which is detailed in Section 3, involves inducing 
survey participation by using (randomised) financial incentives and by appealing to individuals’ 
intrinsic motivation to engage in prosocial behaviour. To better understand how individuals’ 
response to incentives may be a function of mental health, we draw upon the economic framework 
of behaviour in Bénabou and Tirole (2006). They theorised that decisions regarding behaviour that 




{(𝜐𝑎 + 𝜐𝑦𝑦)𝑎 − 𝐶(𝑎) + 𝜇𝑎𝐸(𝜐𝑎|𝑎, 𝑦) − 𝜇𝑦𝐸(𝜐𝑦|𝑎, 𝑦)}   (1) 
 
wherein 𝑎 is the level of participation in behaviour 𝐴 that comes with a utility cost 𝐶(𝑎) and yields 
a material reward 𝑦𝑎. 𝜐𝑎 and 𝜐𝑦 reflect the intrinsic appraisal of 𝑎 and of monetary incentives, 
respectively. 𝜇𝑎 and 𝜇𝑦 are the societal valuation of prosociability and greed, respectively, scaled 
by the salience of behaviour 𝐴. As such, 𝜇𝑎𝐸(𝜐𝑎|𝑎, 𝑦) reflects the image consciousness with regard 
to, or the valuation of appearing to oneself and others as, being prosocial; 𝜇𝑦𝐸(𝜐𝑦|𝑎, 𝑦) relates to 
being non-greedy or disinterested. Differentiating Equation (1) yields: 
 




















which highlights how an individual’s marginal undertaking of 𝑎 is the sum of three sources of 
motivation: (1) intrinsic or altruistic motivation; (2) material self-interest including extrinsic 
incentives; and (3) reputational motivation, particularly social or self-image concerns. This 
multidimensional variation in 𝐶′(𝑎), stemming from these three sources of heterogeneity, is useful 
in hypothesising whether and how observed 𝑎 might differ by mental health status.1   
 First, individuals experiencing poor mental health may be less intrinsically motivated to 
engage in prosocial behaviour, or many other activities, thereby reducing 𝜐𝑎. One of the main 
symptoms of major depressive disorder is anhedonia (APA 2013). Anhedonia is the loss of interest 
in, and an inability to experience pleasure from, enjoyable behaviours. This includes a reduction in 
the motivation to participate in activities (motivational anhedonia) and a reduction in the level of 
experienced enjoyment (consummatory anhedonia). 
 Second, the valuation of monetary incentives 𝜐𝑦 also may be a function of mental health. 
Anhedonia implies a smaller marginal utility of consumption, particularly when chronic and 
comorbid with poor physical health (Finkelstein et al., 2013). Therefore, sufferers’ appraisal of 
money 𝜐𝑦 may be weaker. This may be particularly pertinent if the monetary incentives are to be 
received in the future, because mentally ill individuals might apply a higher discount rate to future 
remunerations than those in good health (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014).2  
 Third, perceptions of one’s own behaviour and of how others in society regard that 
behaviour also may differ by mental health status. For instance, anxiety involves a persistent and 
excessive worry, or fear of things that are difficult to control. This includes social phobia, or a 
marked fear of being exposed to possible scrutiny by other individuals (APA 2013). Individuals 
prone to such symptoms may falsely perceive others to pass harsh judgments on their behaviour, 
thus inflating societal perceptions 𝜇.3  
Note also the potential for incentive amount 𝑦 to alter intrinsic motivation 𝜐𝑎. A non-zero 
incentive could, perhaps even falsely, signal the unattractiveness of the incentivised behaviour, 
suggesting that it is difficult and/or time-consuming. It also can signal a distrust of their intrinsic 
motivation, or an undermining of their ability to demonstrate such behaviour (Bénabou and Tirole, 
2003; Gneezy et al., 2011). These negative signals can lower intrinsic motivation, and perceptions 
                                                          
1 While this model helps us to understand responses to incentives among individuals with common anxiety and depressive 
symptoms, it may not be appropriate to apply it to individuals with certain severe disorders, such as schizophrenia or 
dementia. 
2 This applies to both exponential and hyperbolic discounting, wherein those in poorer mental health can show a higher 
discounting of the future in general, and/or a higher present-orientation (i.e. smaller correction for valuation of future 
remunerations) (Eisenberg and Druss, 2015). 
3 Some mental health conditions may be associated with a lower regard for social disapproval, particularly severe illnesses. 
However, evidence suggest that people with less severe conditions, such as mild or moderate depression, benefit more 
from positive social interactions and suffer more from negative social interactions, relative to mentally healthy people 













of such signals can be irreversible, possibly leading to undesired effects when the incentive is 
reduced or removed (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). This runs parallel to the psychology literature 
on how incentives can “crowd out” intrinsic motivation (for a comprehensive review, see Festré and 
Garrouste, 2015). Bénabou and Tirole (2006) explain that whether incentives “crowd out” (or 
“crowd in”) intrinsic motivation depends on the substitutability (complementarity) of the incentive 
and the social norms attached to the incentivised behaviour. For such counterproductive incentives, 
a sufficiently large incentive would be necessary to compensate for the drop in intrinsic motivation 
(i.e. "pay enough or don't pay at all"; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). 
 
3. Survey Incentives Experiment  
The United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS or Understanding Society) collects 
high-quality longitudinal information on socioeconomic circumstances, health, behaviours, and 
attitudes, primarily from individuals aged 16 and over (Boreham and Constantine, 2008). The 
Innovation Panel is an annual household survey that is separate from, but similar to, the main 
survey in terms of design, content, and data collection procedures (Burton and Lynn, 2015). 
Importantly, it contains experiments on survey procedures and questionnaire designs aimed at 
improving mainstage data collection and quality. The Innovation Panel began in 2008 (Wave 1) on 
a sample of 1,489 households, encompassing 2,866 adults. 
A survey incentives experiment has been included in Waves 1 to 8 of the Innovation Panel. 
However, our empirical analysis is based only on the experiments conducted in Waves 2 to 5. We 
do not analyse the response to incentives in Wave 1, because our estimation sample necessarily 
consists of only those individuals who chose to participate in the Wave 1 survey. In other words, 
among our estimation sample of 2,385 individuals there is 100% participation in Wave 1. This 
decision is necessary because it is from this wave that we obtain most of the individual-level 
information, including mental health. We also do not analyse the response to incentives in Waves 6 
to 8. In these waves, there were several changes to the incentive experiment, such as combining it 
with an interview mode experiment. Therefore, we cannot cleanly isolate the effect of incentives. In 
summary, these combined restrictions mean that our estimation sample contains observations from 
Waves 2 to 5, from individuals who participated fully in Wave 1. 
 In the survey incentives experiment, each household was randomly assigned to an incentive 
condition, and each adult in the household received the same condition. There were three unique 
incentive conditions in Waves 1-5: (i) each adult receives £5 (low); (ii) each adult receives £10 
(high); and (iii) each adult receives £5, but receives an extra £5 (£10 in total) if all eligible adults in 
the household are interviewed (social). These payments were given in the form of High Street gift 













retailers, food and beverage outlets, and attractions. These include major high street names such as 
Argos, Debenhams, Gap, Halfords, House of Fraser, Iceland, Mothercare, River Island, Superdrug, 
TK Maxx, and WHSmith, and thus cover the majority of goods consumed by households.4 
Importantly, although the payment was not made in cash, the vouchers should be easy to spend 
(including on-line and in-store) and thus act as a financial incentive. 
The assignment of households to incentive conditions was conditional on their assigned 
condition in the previous wave. This approach is part of the Innovation Panel’s aim of continually 
improving survey methodology. For instance, Wave 3 aimed to determine whether participation 
would drop if low instead of high incentives were administered. As such, households in the high 
condition at Wave 2 were randomly assigned into low and high conditions at Wave 3, whereas those 
in the low condition at Wave 2 continued in the low condition. In Section 5, we show that the 
incentive condition received in the previous Wave t-1 had no effect on participation in the current 
Wave t. Importantly, this finding holds true for individuals with either high or low mental health. 
Prior to their survey participation decision, individuals received a letter in the mail that 
contained their voucher for participation (either £5 or £10). Interviewers did not hand out vouchers 
during the interview. Any vouchers owing to those who satisfied the conditions of the social 
incentive were recorded by interviewers in a promissory note and were sent after the interview.5 No 
advance vouchers were recalled by interviewers, so vouchers were left with the sample members 
regardless of interview outcome, including refusal or ineligibility.6 Note also that individuals 
received their incentive voucher regardless of survey participation status in the previous wave. In 
other words, even if individuals refused to participate in Wave t-1, they still received individual 
advance mail and incentives (i.e. were ‘treated’), and the interviewers still attempted to contact 
them in Wave t.7  
The letter including the incentive voucher also contained a document requesting 
participation in the survey (see Appendix A for a copy of the document). Importantly, it is made 
clear to individuals that participation is “completely voluntary”, but the document also emphasises 
that survey participation is important for the UK: for example, it states that “it will help us 
understand the long term effects of social and economic change in the UK and assist in future 
decision making.” A follow-up survey information leaflet reinforced the public good nature of 
                                                          
4 For a full list see https://www.highstreetvouchers.com/gift/where-to-spend-love2shop-vouchers. 
5 For those who reportedly did not receive the advance mail and incentive, regardless of whether the interviewer believed 
they were truthful, the appropriate incentive also was recorded in the promissory note, but only if they completed the 
interview.  
6 This is a limitation of the incentive experiment, which could act to reduce the incentive effect. However, our later result 
that a larger incentive significantly increases survey participation for the whole sample suggests that the experiment had 
saliency. 














participation by including statements indicating that survey participation will help “to improve 
everyone’s lives” (see Appendix A for a copy of the leaflet). It is therefore likely that for many 
individuals survey participation was driven by prosocial behaviour in addition to financial reward. 
The first contact with each sample household was a face-to-face personal visit by the 
interviewer designed to build rapport and avoid attrition. After that first contact, subsequent contact 
could be made by telephone, for example to arrange or check on appointment times. Individual 
interviews were attempted with every adult household member, even if initially absent due to work 
or education. The interviewer was expected to make reasonable attempts to contact the sample 
member, including making multiple visits.8  
For our analysis, we define participation as completing the individual interview, which on 
average took 32.5 minutes. Non-participation is defined as refusing to complete the interview.9 
Table 1 displays the sample size for each incentive condition and wave for our estimation sample, 
along with the corresponding rates of survey participation. Survey participation rates in Wave 1 
equal 100% for all conditions because our estimation sample consists of only those individuals who 
completed the Wave 1 survey.10 Overall, most households received the low £5 incentive across 
Waves 2-5, and relatively few households received the social £5-£10 incentive; in Wave 1 only, 
though, the split was roughly equal. The raw data suggest that participation rates were higher for 
individuals assigned to the high £10 incentive: across Waves 2-5 the participation rate in the high 
incentive was 4.4 percentage points higher than in the low incentive group (t-statistic equals 3.70). 
This survey incentives experiment differs from a laboratory experiment and from many 
types of field experiments (namely artefactual and framed) in that: (a) the subject pool is not 
primarily made up of students; (b) it is in a context where the commodity, task and/or information 
set are naturally usable by subjects; (c) it is conducted in an environment where the treatment and 
behaviours of interest would typically take place; and (d) the subjects are unaware they are being 
experimented on. These differences are detailed in full in Harrison and List (2004). However, 
regarding point (c), it is important when observing economic decisions across individuals with 
varying mental health states that we allow them to pay attention not only to the task (survey 
                                                          
8 If no contact was able to be made, the interviewer took steps to trace the sample member, such as by asking or leaving 
a tracing letter with neighbours and/or stable contacts. Sample members who moved were followed to their new address, 
either by the interviewers themselves or by the Understanding Society team, except those who moved outside the UK and 
those in prison. Those who moved into a new household or an institution remained eligible for interviews at their new 
address; these individuals were issued a new advance mail and an incentive if they went on to be interviewed. Proxy 
interviews (with a nominated proxy, a close relative, or another adult in the household who knows the respondent well) 
did not qualify for vouchers, and were only conducted if the interviewer was completely certain that productive interviews 
were not possible. 
9 There were a small number of partially completed interviews. These observations were omitted from the estimation 
sample. 
10 In the full study sample, the number of individuals and percent participating in wave 1 for each incentive condition 
equal: 873 and 94.3% for the low incentive group; 956 and 95.9% for the high incentive group; and 956 and 95.8% for 













participation) or treatment (incentives), but also to their natural environments, which can contain 
other influential factors (e.g. other household and social group members). The cost at which an 
individual engages in an incentivised behaviour may differ between the laboratory and their natural 
environment, which is a more representative setting of the behaviour in which we are interested. For 
example, participants have to accommodate household members’ preferences and to trade off 
extrinsic incentives with time spent engaging in other productive activities, in comparison with 
laboratory tasks that involve only the individual, along with unnatural scrutiny by strangers (Levitt 
and List, 2007).  
 
4. Data and Methods  
4.1. Mental Component Summary Score 
The mental health measure used in this paper is derived from the 12-item Short-Form Health 
Survey (SF-12v2), a reliable, valid, and generic measure of quality of life. It is widely used to 
examine health status and to monitor health outcomes in general and specific populations. In Wave 
1, trained interviewers administered the standard four-week recall version of the questionnaire as 
part of the computer-assisted personal interview. The SF-12v2 contains eight health scales, each 
comprising either one item or two items. These scales are Physical Functioning, Role Physical, 
Bodily Pain, General Health, Vitality, Social Functioning, Role Emotional, and Mental Health. 
From these scales, Physical Component Summary (PCS) and Mental Component Summary (MCS) 
scores are derived via standardisation of the scale scores, and then aggregated with factor score 
coefficients as weights (Ware et al., 2002). The resulting summary scores are then further 
standardised such that the within-sample mean and standard deviation equal zero and one, 
respectively, with higher scores indicating better health. 
 The reported symptoms that drive low MCS scores, such as often feeling “downhearted and 
depressed” and rarely feeling “calm and peaceful”, are commonly experienced by individuals 
suffering from depression and anxiety. However, it is important to avoid over-attributing 
differences in MCS scores to any one specific clinical condition. Certain emotions may present as 
symptoms in multiple types of mental disorders. For instance, current practice views anxiety 
symptoms as also present in various bipolar, depressive, trauma- and stressor-related, and 
obsessive-compulsive disorders (APA, 2013). In addition, symptoms may be indicative of comorbid 
mental disorders (e.g. comorbid anxiety and depression; Zbozinek et al., 2012).  
The validity of the MCS, besides the extensive evidence reviewed in the SF-12v2 manual 
(Ware et al., 2002), is clearly demonstrated in studies measuring impairment from various mental 
disorders. For instance, impairment from drug abuse and dependence (Compton et al., 2007), 













and MDD (Grant, Stinson, et al., 2004) significantly predict scores on the MCS when these 
disorders are considered independently or in comorbidity with other disorders. As in-sample 
evidence for its construct validity, we find that a single standard deviation increase in Wave 1 MCS 
is associated with a drop in the propensity of having a concurrent diagnosis of clinical depression by 
3.1 percentage points.  
For further evidence on the reliability of the MCS, we focus on stability, given that we 
examine the response to incentives across Waves 2 through 5 as a function of Wave 1 mental 
health. This assumes that the MCS can reliably measure respondents’ underlying mental health 
status over a five-year period. We empirically investigate this assumption by estimating transitions 
for the bottom MCS quartile (i.e. poorest mental health) across Waves 1 through 5. Among 
individuals in the bottom MCS quartile at Wave 1, 44.8 percent of their MCS scores over the next 
four years also fall within this quartile. Other respondents in Wave 1 only have 15.8 percent of their 
future MCS scores falling within this quartile. In other words, those in poor mental health are about 
three times as likely as those in better health at Wave 1 to report poor mental health over the 
following four years.  
We additionally estimate linear regression models of Wave 2-5 mental health on Wave 1 
mental health and a full set of wave 1 control variables. The coefficient on Wave 1 mental health 
from regressions of Wave 2, Wave 3, Wave 4 and Wave 5 mental health equals 0.46, 0.43, 0.38 and 
0.37, respectively. The similarity of estimates across waves suggests considerable stability in 
underlying mental health across time. Nevertheless, it is probable that our regression coefficient 
estimates will suffer from some attenuation bias due to the fact that mental health from Wave 1 is a 
mismeasured proxy for true mental health in Waves 2-5. 
Table 2 presents the sample means of the MCS scores by incentive condition and wave 
(Row 1). There are mental health differences between individuals assigned to different incentive 
conditions at each wave, but none of these differences are statistically significant at the 10% level.11 
This suggests that the randomisation process was successful in balancing mental health between 
treatment arms. In the remaining rows of Table 2, the sample means are displayed for physical 
health (PCS) and selected individual characteristics. Again, we find that the covariate distributions 
are similar across conditions. The one exception is that the number of children in the household is 
significantly different across incentive conditions in Wave 4. 
 
                                                          
11 To test for statistical differences, we estimated a multinomial logit model of incentive condition (low, high or social) 
at each wave on the vector of Wave 1 MCS scores and covariates. Bonferroni-adjusted p-values for multiple comparisons 













4.2. Regression Model 
To test for heterogeneity in the effect of incentives, we estimate a linear regression model of 
participation including binary indicators for assigned incentive (high, social), our continuous 
measure of mental health (mcs), and their interactions: 
  
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑚𝑐𝑠𝑖1 + 𝛽4(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝑚𝑐𝑠𝑖1) + 𝛽5(𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝑚𝑐𝑠𝑖1) + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (3) 
 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is a binary indicator of survey participation. The low incentive is the omitted base 
category, hence 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 equal the percentage point differences in the probability of participation 
for individuals with average mental health (given 𝑚𝑐𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅= 0) who have received high and social 
incentives, relative to the low incentive group. Similarly, 𝛽3 equals the effect of mental health on 
participation for individuals who have received the low incentive, while 𝛽3 + 𝛽4 equals the effect of 
mental health on participation for individuals who have received the high incentive.12  
 The vector of covariates 𝑋𝑖𝑡 include individual-level characteristics measured in Wave 1 and 
time-varying survey conditions. The individual-level characteristics include gender, age, marital 
status, number of children in the household, number of adults in the household, years of education, 
employment status, and weekly earnings. It is also important to control for physical health, given 
the potential for co-morbidities between mental and physical health conditions. In our main 
specification we use the Physical Component Summary (PCS) score from the SF-12v2, and in 
robustness specifications we use a binary indicator of a long-standing illness or disability. The 
sample means of the covariates by wave and incentive group are presented in Table 2. The standard 
deviations of the continuous covariates, which aid in the interpretation of coefficient magnitudes, 
equal 17.7 for age, 6.4 for years of education, 211.8 for wages, 0.9 for number of adults, and 0.9 for 
number of children. The mental and physical health indices are standardised and so have a standard 
deviation of one. 
The covariate vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 also includes the incentive condition received in Wave 1 (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖1 
and 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖1), given that the random assignment of incentives in Waves 2 to 4 are conditional on 
the Wave 1 incentive. However, these variables are not statistically significant predictors of 
participation in any estimated model. We also control for the concurrent survey mode experiments 
that were conducted independently from our incentives experiment (Burton and Lynn, 2015). 
Specifically, we control for telephone versus face-to-face interviews (Wave 2), the paper self-
completion versus computer-assisted self-interviewing (Waves 4 and 5), and the online versus face-
                                                          
12 It is possible that the estimates of 𝛽3, 𝛽4 and 𝛽5 will suffer from attenuation bias due to the fact that mental health from 
Wave 1 is a mismeasured proxy for mental health in Waves 2-5. The mental health gradients found in Section 5 may 













to-face interviews (Wave 5). Finally, we control for wave dummies given the likely trend in 
participation over time. 
 Importantly, levels of mental health are not randomly distributed among sampled 
individuals; low mental health scores are significantly more likely among females (t-stat = 4.48), 
non-employed individuals (t-stat = 5.44), and singles (t-stat = 2.96). Therefore, it is important that 
we test whether the estimated coefficients in Equation (3) are sensitive to the addition of 
interactions between these characteristics and the incentive conditions (e.g. addition of ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∙
𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖1 and 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖1). These robustness models are presented in Section 5.2. We also test 
the robustness of our results to the use of alternative estimation models, including probit, random-
effects and fixed-effects models. 
 
5. Results  
5.1. Main Analysis 
In Column (1) of Table 3 we present estimates from a parsimonious version of Equation (3) that 
contains the incentive condition indicators, the continuous mental health score, their interactions, 
and controls for interview wave and mode. The estimates suggest that an individual with average 
mental health who was assigned to the high £10 incentive is 4.2 percentage points more likely to 
participate in the survey than an individual with average mental health who was assigned to the low 
£5 incentive; this effect is significant at the 1% level.13 As expected, higher financial rewards 
increase survey participation.  
 In contrast, there are no significant differences between individuals assigned to the social 
and low incentive conditions, despite the potential additional payment of £5 per person if all eligible 
household members participated. One possible explanation for this finding is that the potential 
additional payment of £5 served as an anchor when deciding whether the incentive already received 
was a fair compensation for their time. This effect would be exacerbated in multiple person 
households, where it was less likely that all eligible members would participate; thus the additional 
£5 was ‘lost’. This explanation is supported by the estimate in Column (3) indicating a significantly 
negative interaction effect between the social incentive condition and number of adults in the 
household: participation in the social incentive condition is estimated to decrease by an extra 6.4 
percentage points for every additional household member, compared with participation in the low 
incentive condition. 
 Notably, in column (1) the coefficient on the Mental Component Summary (MCS) score is 
significantly negative, suggesting that among individuals assigned to the low £5 incentive, 
                                                          













individuals with good mental health were significantly less likely to participate than individuals 
with poor mental health. The value of -0.019 indicates that participation decreases by 1.9 
percentage points with a single standard deviation increase in mental health. This finding contrasts 
with the positive mental health gradient for individuals assigned to the high incentive condition. 
The estimate for this group reveals that participation increases as mental health improves, by 1.1 
percentage points per standard deviation (-0.019 + 0.030 = 0.011); however, the effect is not 
statistically significant at the 10% level.14 Another equally valid interpretation of these results is 
that providing a low financial incentive generates a significant negative effect of good mental health 
on participation. 
 Figure 1 graphically represents the estimated effects from Column (1) of Table 3. Figure 1a 
shows the estimated mental health gradients of individuals who are randomly assigned to the high 
and low incentive schemes, and Figure 1b shows the estimated difference in these gradients. The 
mental health gradient for individuals assigned to the social incentive is very similar to the low 
incentive gradient, so for clarity purposes is not presented. Overall, Figure 1 implies that individuals 
with poor mental health (e.g. MCS ≤ -1) are indifferent to their incentive condition in this 
experiment, whereas individuals with good mental health respond more strongly to high financial 
incentives than to low financial incentives. 
 In Column (2) of Table 3 we can see whether the findings of Column (1) are robust to the 
inclusion of controls for individual-level characteristics and Wave 1 incentive conditions. The 
estimates in the top panel of Table 3 are little changed, indicating that the findings are robust. For 
example, the estimated main effect of the high £10 incentive increases from 0.042 to 0.043, while 
the estimated main effect of mental health equals -0.019 in both specifications. Of these additional 
covariates, the strongest predictor of participation is the quadratic age function. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that the economically active are less available for interviews or 
require greater compensation for their time than their younger (e.g. students) and older counterparts 
(e.g. retirees). Another interesting finding is how living with more adults decreases the likelihood of 
participation: moving from one adult in the household to two adults is estimated to reduce 
participation by 3.8 percentage points. The result may be due to diffusion of responsibility within 
the household. The more adults present, the less likely that refusal (which can be at the household 
level) can be attributed to any one individual. This could equate to a smaller reputational motivation 
𝜇𝑎 in our behavioural framework. On the other hand, the marginal contribution of each individual 
towards completion of the survey diminishes with the number of adults, given that only one 
                                                          
14 The aggregated mental health effect across all three incentive conditions equals -0.013 (with standard error 0.006), 
indicating that participation decreases by 1.3 percentage points with a one standard deviation increase in mental health. 
This negative effect is driven by the strong negative mental health gradient associated with the low incentive group. The 













respondent is required to provide household-level information. This marginal contribution effect 
would work in the opposite direction. 
 In Column (3) we add interactions between the control variables and the incentive 
conditions. None of the interactions are statistically significant for the high incentive condition, and 
only the interaction with number of adults in the household is statistically significant for the social 
incentive condition. Correspondingly, the mental health interaction effects decrease only slightly: 
from 0.033 in Column (2) to 0.029 in Column (3).15 The estimated main effect of the high incentive 
drops from 0.043 in Column (2) to 0.015 in Column (3). However, this change is due solely to the 
fact that it now represents the estimated effect of receiving the high incentive for individuals with 
zero values of each of the interaction variables.16 
  It is somewhat surprising that responses to financial incentives are similar between those 
with poor and good physical health. Finkelstein et al. (2013) concluded from their analysis of data 
from the US Health and Retirement Study that marginal utility significantly declines with number 
of chronic diseases (defined as hypertension, diabetes, cancer, heart disease, chronic lung disease, 
stroke and arthritis). It is possible that the Physical Component Summary (PCS) score from the SF-
12v2 is not fully measuring chronic illness, so we additionally estimated a specification that 
included interactions between incentive conditions and an indicator for a “long-standing illness, 
disability or infirmity”. Again, we find no significant interaction effects between this indicator and 
the high and social conditions. 
 One potentially restrictive assumption inherent in Equation (3), and in the findings in Table 
3 and Figure 1, is the linearity of the relationship between mental health and participation. To 
explore this issue, we re-estimate the participation model with MCS quintile indicators and 
interactions between the MCS quintile and incentive indicators. Table 4 presents the estimates from 
this model, which is based on the Column (2) specification from Table 3. They show that the 
differences in participation between high and low incentive conditions are driven largely by 
differences for individuals in the top two quintiles (MCS Q4 and MCS Q5). For these mental health 
groups, estimated participation is 6.8 percentage points and 8.3 percentage points higher for 
individuals in the high incentive condition than for individuals in the low condition. Individuals in 
                                                          
15 The regressions shown in Table 3 do not contain household income as a covariate. Our approach was to use a 
parsimonious regression specification, especially with regard to the number of interaction terms. In addition, age, gender, 
education, employment and household size are all strongly correlated with income. Robustness models that include 
income show that it: is not a significant predictor of participation (once controlling for other characteristics); does not 
diminish the impact of receiving a high incentive; and does not affect the main mental health effect and the mental health 
interaction effect with the high incentive. 
16 We have additionally estimated models with lagged incentive conditions, to determine whether the history of incentive 
payments are a determinant of participation behaviour. Coefficients on the lagged incentive payment variables are small 














the bottom two quintiles (MCS Q1 and MCS Q2) behave similarly, regardless of the incentive they 
receive. The estimated participation rate of high incentive individuals in the middle quintile of 
mental health (MCS Q3) is 4 percentage points higher than that of low incentive individuals in the 
middle quintile, but the difference is not statistically significant.17  
Figure 2 presents these estimates graphically. The left-hand side graph shows that among 
individuals assigned to the low incentive, those with mental health in the top quintile (MCS Q5) are 
4.8 percentage points less likely to participate than those in the bottom quintile (MCS Q1). Among 
those in the high incentive, the difference in participation between the top and bottom mental health 
quintiles equals 2.3 percentage points (0.083 - 0.048 - 0.012 = 0.023), but is not statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The difference between the fifth and second quintiles of mental health 
is larger, equalling 5.3 percentage points (p-value = 0.12). The right-hand side graph illustrates that 
differences in participation between incentive conditions are driven by differences among 
individuals with good mental health. 
 One possible explanation for our findings is that individuals with poor mental health: (i) 
have a low valuation of monetary incentives, for example due to anhedonia (small 𝜐𝑦 in Equation 
1); and (ii) are particularly concerned with how others regard their behaviour due to low self-esteem 
or anxiety, thus finding it difficult to refuse an interviewer at their doorstep (high 𝜇𝑎 in Equation 1). 
A small 𝜐𝑦 would drive the finding that individuals with poor mental health are less responsive to 
their incentive condition. A high 𝜇𝑎 would drive the finding that in the low incentive condition, 
individuals with poor mental health have higher participation rates than individuals with good 
mental health. 
 A related, but slightly different, explanation is that the negative mental health gradient for 
the low incentive group is driven not by high 𝜇𝑎 among individuals with poor mental health, but 
rather by a low intrinsic motivation among individuals with good mental health due to a ‘crowding 
out’ effect. As mentioned in Section 2, financial incentives could (falsely) signal the 
unattractiveness of survey participation, being difficult and time-consuming, while also signalling a 
distrust of participants’ intrinsic motivation. In such a situation, a sufficiently large incentive would 
be necessary to compensate for the drop in intrinsic motivation, and £5 may be too low. 
 
5.2. Robustness Analysis 
This subsection explores the robustness of our main findings by varying the baseline specification 
shown in Column (2) of Table 3 and the estimation sample. First, we test the sensitivity of the 
                                                          
17 Regarding the different groups used in Table 4, the participation rates for mental health quintiles 1-5 in the low incentive 
group equal 0.83, 0.81, 0.80, 0.81 and 0.79, and the participation rates for mental health quintiles 1-5 in the high incentive 













estimated mental health interaction effects to alternative measures of mental health. In Columns (1) 
to (4) of Table 5, we replace the MCS with the SF-12v2 health scales that primarily load onto the 
MCS: (i) Vitality (“have a lot of energy”); (ii) Social Functioning (“physical health or emotional 
problems interfered with your social activities”); (iii) Role Emotional (“problems with your work or 
other regular daily activities as a result of any emotional problems”); and (iv) Mental Health (“felt 
calm and peaceful”, “felt downhearted and depressed”). Unlike the MCS, these scales are based on 
a small range of values, so we operationalise them as binary indicators: individuals in poor mental 
health (roughly the bottom 20%) are assigned the value 0, and individuals in fair and good mental 
health are assigned the value 1. These are defined precisely in the notes of Table 5. In Column (5) 
of Table 5 we use an entirely different mental health scale: the Centre for Epidemiologic Studies 
Depression Scale (CES-D), which measures symptoms defined by the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-V) for a major depressive episode. Again, 
this scale is operationalised by transforming it into a binary measure using the validated cut-point 
for clinical depression (≤20 on the reverse-scored scale; Andresen et al., 1994). 
 The estimated interaction effects in Columns (1) to (5) represent differences in the 
probability of survey participation relative to those in fair and good mental health who are receiving 
the low ₤5 incentive. The group that is most significantly different from this base category are those 
in fair and good (better) mental health who are receiving the high £10 incentive. When we use the 
Vitality, Social Functioning, Role Emotional, Mental Health and CES-D scales to characterise 
mental health, our estimates suggest that participation is increased by 4.7, 5.7, 6.1, 5.7 and 5.7 
percentage points, respectively (all significant at the 1% level). In other words, higher financial 
incentives significantly increase participation for those who are not mentally unwell, regardless of 
the mental health scale used. In contrast, for those who have poor mental health, differences in 
participation between those receiving low £5 and high £10 incentives are not statistically significant 
across the five measures (p-values = 0.374, 0.364, 0.165, 0.643 and 0.308 for Columns 1 to 5), and 
are not even consistent in sign across the measures.18 
Next we explore how the estimated effects of the financial incentives and their interactions 
change over time. Our a priori expectation was that financial incentives would become more 
important after repeated waves, corresponding to a decline in the importance of prosocial 
behaviour, especially among individuals in good mental health: after several waves, mentally well 
individuals may legitimately feel that they have contributed sufficiently to the public good, and are 
therefore happy to say “no” to the interviewer. The results in Table 6 support this expectation. The 
                                                          
18 Care must be taken when evaluating the statistical significance of individual effects in Table 5, given the multiple 
estimates presented (i.e. the multiple comparisons problem). For this reason, we focus only on those estimates that are 













effect of the high £10 incentive is larger and statistically significant for the Waves 4 and 5 sample, 
suggesting that the incentive amount was more important for the average individual in later waves. 
Similarly, the mental health and high £10 incentive interaction effect is large and statistically 
significant for Waves 4 and 5 (0.052), but close to zero and insignificant for Waves 2 and 3 (-
0.001).  
 Finally, we explore the robustness of the estimates to alternative estimators. Appendix B 
presents estimates from a linear random-effects model, a probit model and a linear fixed-effects 
model. For the random-effects and probit models, the interaction between the MCS score and the 
high £10 incentive condition is significantly positive, supporting our main finding that individuals 
with good mental health are more responsive to financial incentives than are individuals with poor 
mental health. However, in the fixed-effects model the interaction effect is not statistically 
significant. There are two explanations for this result. First, around 30% of individuals are assigned 
to both the low £5 and high £10 incentive conditions in Waves 2 to 5. Thus, the fixed-effect 
estimate is identified from a relatively small sample. Second, the vast majority of this within-
individual variation occurs in Waves 2 and 3. Therefore, the fixed-effects estimate relates primarily 
to the effect of financial incentives in these early waves. As Table 6 demonstrates, that effect was 
smaller than in later waves. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Every year, up to 20% of adults in the UK and US experience common mental health conditions, 
such as anxiety and depression. Given the extensive role that financial incentives play in public 
policy with regard to encouraging and discouraging certain actions and behaviours, it is important 
to understand whether individuals in poor mental health react differently to those in good mental 
health to the same economic stimuli. Individuals in poor mental health often experience a loss of 
pleasure in daily activities, and feel that others are critically judging their behaviour; as such, they 
may show a different pattern of response to financial incentives. 
 For a theoretical motivation to our empirical analysis, we draw upon the economic 
framework of behaviour by Bénabou and Tirole (2006). Within this framework, we suggest that the 
common symptoms experienced by those with anxiety and depression lead to the hypotheses that 
there is a mental health gradient in individuals’ marginal utility of consumption, and that prosocial 
behaviour differs by mental health status.  If this is the case, and poor mental health acts to dampen 
the response to incentives, then this might help to explain the lower investment in education and 













 There is little research on this issue, so to shed some new light, we assess whether effort 
exerted in response to financial incentives varies as a function of mental health. Our analysis is 
grounded in the context of a survey incentives experiment that incorporates a real-world effort task. 
In particular, the data come from the survey incentives experiment on the Innovation Panel of the 
UK Household Longitudinal Study, which is conducted in an environment where the treatment and 
behaviour of interest would typically take place and where subjects are unaware of the experiment. 
 As expected, we find that a higher financial incentive increases survey partication. However, 
while individuals in good mental health are significantly more likely to participate in the survey 
when financial incentives are higher, the likelihood of participation amongst individuals in poor 
mental health is unrelated to the level of financial incentives. Interestingly, we find no such 
differential response by physical health status. These results are robust to controlling for differential 
response by age, gender and socioeconomic status, and to various measures of mental and physical 
health. 
 Our study is not without limitations. First, although the survey experiment is conducted in a 
natural environment that allows us to distinguish between those in good and poor mental health, the 
value of the financial incentives are modest. However, given that we find that these amounts induce 
significantly increased survey participation only for those in good mental health, it might well be 
the case that a dampened response for those in poor mental health would also be found for the larger 
financial incentives typically used by policy-makers. Further research on this topic using larger 
financial incentives, and in contexts other than survey participation, would therefore be valuable. 
Second, it is not possible for us to precisely isolate the differences in economic preferences that 
cause this pattern of results. Possible theoretical motivations include that those with poor mental 
health have a low marginal utility of consumption, a high valuation of prosocial behaviour, and are 
driven by a heightened concern with how others regard their actions. Again, hopefully future 
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Figure 1. Estimated Effects of Mental Health on Participation in High and Low Incentive 
Conditions, and the Difference in Effects 
 
Notes: Graphs constructed using the estimates presented in Column (1) of Table 3. Bars in (b) 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Figure 2. Estimated Effects of Mental Health using Mental Health Quintiles 
 
Notes: Graphs constructed using the estimates presented in Table 4. Bars in (b) represent 




















































































































































Table 1. Numbers of Individuals and Percent Participating per Incentive Condition and Wave in 
Main Estimation Sample 
 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Waves 2-5 
Low ₤5 incentive 738 1589 1753 995 886 5223 
 [100%] [80.6%] [76.7%] [72.7%] [78.1] [77.3%] 
High ₤10 incentive 834 407 207 707 710 2031 
 [100%] [86.3%] [84.8%] [77.6%] [82.1] [81.7%] 
Social ₤5-₤10 incentive 813 389 383 331 0 1103 
 [100%] [81.2%] [78.4%] [65.2%] [-] [75.4%] 
Total 2385 2385 2343 2033 1596 8357 
 [100%] [81.8%] [77.8%] [73.0%] [79.9%] [78.2%] 
Notes: Low=£5 for each responding adult in the household; high=£10 for each responding adult in the 
household; social=£5 for each responding adult in the household but rising to £10 if all eligible adults 
responded. Figures in square brackets are percentages indicating participation rate. Calculations of 
percentage participating do not include missing values (i.e. those showing responses other than participating 
and refusing to participate, such as proxy interview, deceased, moved, no contact able to be made, too 















Table 2. Means of Wave 1 Mental Health and Selected Characteristics by Incentive Treatment and Wave 
 
Wave 1 measurements 
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Low High Social Low High Social Low High Social Low High Social Low High 
Mental health index  0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.18 0.05 -0.07 -0.17 0.06 0.02 -0.17 0.01 -0.02 
Physical health index -0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.00 -0.09 0.03 0.07 -0.07 -0.00 0.10 
Male 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.44 
Age 49.7 48.5 48.6 48.6 50.2 48.9 49.3 48.4 49.0 48.8 49.4 48.6 48.9 48.8 
Years of education 18.9 19.2 19.1 19.2 18.7 18.7 19.2 18.9 18.8 19.1 19.1 18.8 19.2 19.1 
Employment 0.54 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.58 
Net weekly wages 175.4 178.1 173.9 179.6 161.4 175.6 177.4 170.1 176.6 178.4 176.1 181.7 186.1 186.1 
No. of adults in HH 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.2 
No. of children in HH 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7* 0.6 0.5 
Sample size 738 834 813 1589 407 389 1753 207 383 995 707 331 886 710 
Notes: HH=household. Health and covariates are measured at Wave 1. Mental health and physical health indices refer to the Mental Component 
Summary (MCS) and Physical Component Summary (PCS), respectively, from the SF-12v2. These two scores are standardised to have mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1 with higher scores indicating better health, following the norm-based scoring in Ware et al. (2002). Sample size equals 2385 
individuals with nonmissing MCS at Wave 1 (10742 observations from Waves 1 through 5 with nonmissing incentive information). To test for 
differences in variable distributions between incentive conditions, a multinomial logit model is used to regress incentive condition on the row variables 
at each wave. Hypothesis tests for differences in marginal effects between conditions are then conducted using Bonferroni-adjusted p-values. Low is 
retained as base condition (standard errors clustered at the individual level), but similar results are seen with High as base condition. *, ** and *** 













Table 3. Estimated Effects of Incentives, Mental Health and their Interactions from OLS 
Regressions Models of Participation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
High ₤10 incentive 0.042*** (0.013) 0.043*** (0.014) 0.015 (0.086) 
Social ₤5-₤10 incentive -0.025 (0.020) -0.005 (0.023) 0.076 (0.124) 
Mental health score  -0.019** (0.008) -0.019** (0.008) -0.018** (0.008) 
High incentive x mental health 0.030** (0.013) 0.033** (0.013) 0.029** (0.013) 
Social incentive x mental health -0.006 (0.016) -0.006 (0.016) -0.003 (0.017) 
Physical health index   0.006 (0.007) 0.008 (0.009) 
Male   -0.007 (0.013) -0.004 (0.016) 
Age in years / 10   0.104
*** (0.022) 0.106*** (0.023) 
Age2/100   -0.010
*** (0.002) -0.011*** (0.002) 
Years of education / 10   0.014 (0.010) 0.009 (0.012) 
Employed   0.045 (0.063) 0.038 (0.063) 
Number of adults in household   -0.038
*** (0.008) -0.033*** (0.010) 
Number of children in household   -0.017
** (0.008) -0.008 (0.010) 
High Wave 1 incentive   0.024 (0.016) 0.023 (0.017) 
Social Wave 1 incentive   -0.012 (0.019) -0.012 (0.019) 
Interactions with high incentive        
Physical health index     0.001 (0.016) 
Male     -0.007 (0.026) 
Age in years / 10     -0.000 (0.010) 
Years of education / 10     0.004 (0.018) 
Employed     0.043 (0.031) 
Number of adults in household     0.014 (0.016) 
Number of children in household     -0.022 (0.017) 
Interactions with social incentive        
Physical health index     -0.009 (0.021) 
Male     -0.001 (0.038) 
Age in years / 10     -0.002 (0.014) 
Years of education / 10     0.051* (0.027) 
Employed     -0.002 (0.047) 
Number of adults in household     -0.064*** (0.024) 
Number of children in household     -0.011 (0.020) 
Interview mode and wave controls       
Number of observations 6954  6954  6954  
Number of individuals 2255  2255  2255  
R-Squared 0.005  0.033  0.038  
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator equalling 1 if the individual participates and 
equalling 0 if the individual refuses to participate. Model (3) additionally controls for full wave-
incentive interactions. Mental health and physical health indices are standardised to have mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1, with higher scores indicating better health. Omitted incentive category is ‘Low 
₤5 incentive’. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and 















Table 4. Estimated Effects of Mental Health Quintiles from the OLS Regressions Model of 
Participation 
MCS Q2 (20-40th percentile) -0.029 (0.025) 
MCS Q3 (40-60th percentile) -0.035 (0.026) 
MCS Q4 (60-80th percentile) -0.030 (0.025) 
MCS Q5 (80-100th percentile) -0.048* (0.026) 
   
High ₤10 incentive * MCS Q1 0.012 (0.029) 
High ₤10 incentive * MCS Q2 0.011 (0.031) 
High ₤10 incentive * MCS Q3 0.040 (0.031) 
High ₤10 incentive * MCS Q4 0.068** (0.028) 
High ₤10 incentive * MCS Q5 0.083*** (0.029) 
   
Social ₤5-₤10 incentive * MCS Q1 0.023 (0.039) 
Social ₤5-₤10 incentive * MCS Q2 -0.024 (0.043) 
Social ₤5-₤10 incentive * MCS Q3 0.027 (0.047) 
Social ₤5-₤10 incentive * MCS Q4 -0.054 (0.049) 
Social ₤5-₤10 incentive * MCS Q5 0.014 (0.047) 
Number of observations 6954  
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator equalling 1 if the 
individual participates and equalling 0 if the individual refuses to 
participate. The sample is disaggregated into MH quintiles, with 
higher quintiles reflecting better mental health. This regression 
follows the specification in Column (2) of Table 3. Omitted 
incentive category is ‘Low ₤5 incentive’. Standard errors clustered at 
the individual level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
















Table 5. Estimated from OLS Regressions Models of Participation using Alternative 















High incentive & poor MH 0.066** 0.025 -0.007 0.037 -0.029 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.023) (0.030) 
High incentive & better MH 0.047*** 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) 
Low incentive & poor MH 0.038* 0.054** 0.040* 0.026 0.004 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) 
Low incentive & better MH - - - - - 
      
Social incentive & poor MH 0.070* 0.029 0.065* 0.015 0.012 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.037) (0.033) (0.044) 
Social incentive & better MH -0.010 0.002 -0.009 0.002 -0.022 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) 
Percentage classified as ‘better’ 0.833 0.840 0.843 0.712 0.781 
Number of observations 6954 6954 6954 6954 5581 
Number of individuals 2255 2255 2255 2255 1790 
R-Squared 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.032 0.033 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator equalling 1 if the individual participates and equalling 
0 if the individual refuses to participate. Mental health dimensions in Columns (1) to (4) are SF-12v2 
health scales, whereas Model (5) uses the Centre for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-
D). Dichotomisation to ‘better mental health’ (‘poor’ otherwise) is as follows: (1) “have a lot of 
energy” all, most, or some of the time; (2) “physical health or emotional problems interfered with 
your social activities” a little or none of the time; (3) responses are a little or none of the time to “as a 
result of any emotional problems, accomplished less than you would like” and a little or none of the 
time to “as a result of any emotional problems, did work or other activities less carefully than usual”; 
(4) responses are all, most, or some of the time to “felt calm and peaceful”, and a little or none of the 
time to “felt downhearted and depressed”; (5) scoring ≤20 on the reverse-scored CES-D, following 
the validated cutpoint identifying depressive symptomatology related to clinical depression (≥10 on 
the original CES-D scale; Andresen et al. 1994). All regressions follow the specification in Column 
(2) of Table 3. Omitted incentive category is ‘Low incentive & better mental health’. Standard errors 
clustered at the individual level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 















Table 6. OLS Regressions Models of Participation Estimated Separately by Wave 
 Waves 2 & 3 
(1) 
Waves 4 & 5 
(2) 
High ₤10 incentive 0.038 (0.023) 0.041** (0.019) 
Social ₤5-₤10 incentive 0.031 (0.026) -0.071** (0.032) 
Mental health score  -0.012 (0.009) -0.029** (0.012) 
High incentive x mental health -0.001 (0.020) 0.052*** (0.018) 
Social incentive x mental health 0.001 (0.017) -0.023 (0.025) 
     
Physical health index 0.011 (0.009) -0.002 (0.010) 
Male 0.002 (0.015) -0.018 (0.018) 
Age in years / 10 0.109*** (0.026) 0.097*** (0.030) 
Age2/100 -0.012*** (0.003) -0.009*** (0.003) 
Years of education / 10 0.006 (0.012) 0.024** (0.012) 
Employed 0.051 (0.083) 0.039 (0.083) 
Number of adults in household -0.039*** (0.009) -0.036*** (0.010) 
Number of children in household -0.020** (0.009) -0.013 (0.010) 
High Wave 1 incentive 0.027 (0.021) 0.023 (0.021) 
Social Wave 1 incentive -0.025 (0.023) 0.002 (0.024) 
Number of observations 3858  3096  
Number of individuals 2195  1806  
R-Squared 0.030  0.041  
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator equalling 1 if the individual 
participates and equalling 0 if the individual refuses to participate. Mental health 
and physical health indices are standardised to have mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1, with higher scores indicating better health. All regressions follow the 
specification in Column (2) of Table 3. Omitted incentive category is ‘Low 
incentive & better mental health’. Omitted incentive category is ‘Low ₤5 
incentive’. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels. 
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